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Abstract
How does future expected fertility affect current educational investment? Theory suggests
that expected fertility can impact both returns to education and the resources available for
parental consumption. Using policy data about varying eligibility criteria for second child
permits during the One-Child-Policy in China, I investigate the effect of eligibility status on
fertility and education. In the 1990s, second child permits increased the likelihood of having a
second child by 11 percentage points. Being allowed to have a second child increased schooling
by 0.7 years on average, an effect that is likely concentrated in the subset of individuals for
whom the permit constraint is binding.
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1 Introduction
Is there a trade-off between having children and acquiring education? Most empirical literature
suggests a negative relation between a parent’s educational level and the number of children. There
is strong evidence indicating that women tend to have fewer children once educated. However,
this does not answer the question of whether men and women that expect to have several children
in the future choose to pursue a higher or lower level of education than those who expect none
or few. Theory suggests that expected fertility can influence schooling investment through two
economic channels: life-time returns to schooling, and family consumption. However, as the two
channels can have opposite effects, the overall effect on education is ambiguous, and an empirical
investigation is required.
China’s One-Child-Policy provides a unique opportunity to evaluate empirically the effect of
expected fertility on educational investment: having a second child was allowed with a “second
child permit” and the eligibility criteria for these permits were set on the provincial level. The
provincial and temporal variation in the opportunity to have a second child without having to
pay fines provides quasi-exogenous individual variation in the cost of the second child. After
establishing that eligibility for a second child permit is a strong predictor of having a second child,
I use the eligibility status of an individual at secondary education age as a proxy for expected
fertility in order to investigate its effect on educational investment.
The answer to this question is important for policy makers considering how reforms that affect
fertility potentially influence educational investment. Policy makers might be concerned that
policies that encourage individuals to have children, such as parental leave or free child care, have
the side effect of keeping future parents from investing in education. This paper argues that under
certain circumstances, higher expected fertility can actually increase educational investment.
Basic educational decisions are typically taken before individuals have children, however, these
individuals and their families might take into account how many they expect to have in the future.
A basic two period model is used to motivate the empirical analysis and illustrate two channels
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through which fertility expectations can affect educational investment: First, when having children
is seen as costly (rather than as an investment), children decrease future parental consumption
and thereby increase the incentives to use educational investment to transfer consumption to
the future. Second, children can affect the time their parents can spend working in the labour
market and in this way impact lifetime returns to education. When the second mechanism is rel-
atively weaker than the first, planning on having more children can increase educational investment.
For the empirical investigation, I use variation in the provincial regulation during the One-
Child-Policy in China that sets the number of children an individual is allowed to have based
on observable characteristics. During the One-Child-Policy in China, while monetary fines,
disciplinary measures and social penalties were employed to discourage having more than one
child, some couples had the possibility to apply for a permit allowing them to have a second
child. Falling into one of the exemption categories can increase expected fertility from one to two
children. It can, however, also relieve an individual planning on having two children in the future,
regardless of the penalties, from having to pay income-dependent fines.
Utilizing provincial and temporal variations in the eligibility criteria for second child permits,
I calculate the number of children an individual is allowed to have at age 16 when individuals
finish junior high school and the decision to continue with senior high school is taken. Using a
triple-differences approach, I am able to compare similar individuals within a province before and
after second child permit reforms with individuals in the same province who do not experience a
change in their eligibility status. Provinces that did not change policies during that time help to
control for the effect of eligibility characteristics as well as annual national or provincial trends.
First, using an older cohort that had finished their main reproductive stage in 2010, I find that
being allowed to have two children increases the likelihood of having a second child on average by
11 percentage points. Next, I look at individuals that turned 16 during the 1990s and subsequently
have not finished their reproductive stage by 2010 but did finish their educational stage. I find
that being allowed to have two children instead of one at the age of 16 increases significantly the
years of education undertaken for both men and women by 0.7 years on average. Eligibility for a
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second child permit significantly increases the likelihood to finish junior and senior high school1.
Furthermore, I want to determine who is most affected by the second child permit reforms.
Some individuals might plan to have one child or two children independent of eligibility for second
child permits. I use the older cohort to find regional and individual level predictors for fertility
outcome and use those to predict the likelihood of having a second child without the permits.
I find that those who react to the reforms with an increase in educational investment have a
medium range likelihood of having a second child absent of second child permit. I argue that the
overall positive effect on schooling investment is driven by those for whom the permit constraint
is binding, meaning those who increase their fertility expectations from one child to two as a
response to being eligible for a second child permit.
This paper adds to the vast literature on schooling investment and fertility. Theoretical growth
models and country level empirical work usually connect low fertility rates and high human capital
investment (Becker et al. [1990], Rosenzweig [1990], Kalemli-Ozcan [2003]). On an individual level,
female education in particular is usually associated with lower fertility rates (Osili and Long [2008],
Lam and Duryea [1999], Schultz [1997], Duflo et al. [2015] among others). The main economic
argument is that the opportunity costs of having a child for an educated woman are higher than
for a non-educated woman (based on Becker [1981]). Educated individuals on average have higher
earnings that they might have to forgo when childbearing. Other explanations are that education
increases the knowledge of contraception methods (Rosenzweig and Schultz [1989]) and increases
the bargaining power of women who might want to have fewer children than men (Manser and
Brown [1980]).
Many studies establishing the causal relationship between high human capital investment and
low fertility focus on high fertility countries (like Duflo et al. [2015], Osili and Long [2008], Duflo
et al. [2017]). Developed countries often face fertility rates below the replacement rate and aim
to raise their fertility levels. At the same time, governments want high educational investments
1While primary and secondary education is completed before the reproductive stage in this context (marriage
is only allowed after 20 (women) and 22 (men)), tertiary education overlaps with the reproductive stage, making
analysis theoretically different. This paper focuses solely on secondary education.
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and might wonder if this contradicts their fertility goal. This paper looks at the effect of expected
fertility on schooling investment in a low fertility setting and presents the case that wanting a
family in the future does not necessarily hold one back from education. However, labour market
conditions are important. If parents can easily return to the labour market after childbirth and
do not have to fear lower returns to education than their childless co-workers, wanting children
should not have a negative effect on educational decisions. This applies to China where women
are relatively well integrated in the labour market and where grandparents play an important role
in raising children (Chen et al. [2011]). It is also important to note that this paper looks at the
intensive margin of expected fertility (having one more child) and not at the extensive margin
(having the first child). As such, the results are in line with studies that find that having one more
children has no or only a weak effect on the mother’s earnings in the long run (Angrist and Evans
[1996], Jacobsen et al. [1999], Lundborg et al. [2017]).
A distinct but connected strand of literature looks at the effect of contraception on the
educational investment choices of women (Goldin and Katz [2002], Ananat and Hungerman [2012],
Miller [2010]). The idea is that contraceptive methods give women certainty over the pregnancy
consequences of sex and thus decrease the risk of tertiary schooling investment. This paper
assumes, however, that individuals can plan their fertility outcome as well as the timing of their
pregnancies, an appropriate assumption for many high and middle income countries, including
China.
This paper also adds to the literature on the One-Child-Policy (OCP) in China and has
implications for the effect of the current changes in fertility policies allowing two children. There
is an ongoing discussion about how effectively fines and campaigns decreased fertility rates
during the OCP (McElroy and Yang [2000], Li [1995]). Data related to the OCP has been used
to investigate the relationship between education and fertility outcome, mostly addressing the
quality-quantity trade-off that parents face when they decide how many children they want to
have and how much they want to invest in each child (Qin et al. [2016], Li and Zhang [2016],
Rosenzweig and Zhang [2009]). The exemption from the strict OCP for some ethnic minorities
has been used to study inter-ethnic marriages (Huang and Zhou [2015]) and ethnic identity (Jia
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and Persson [2017]). To the best of my knowledge, the only paper discussing a similar idea and
using variation in the enforcement in the OCP as an identification mechanism is the recent work
by Huang et al. [2016]. However, they only use the regional variation in monetary fines that, in
the data set I use, has no effect on either schooling investment or on fertility choice. Furthermore,
they assume that an increase in monetary fines decreases expected fertility without discussing
that it might also increase the cost of having a second child while keeping expected fertility constant.
2 Exogenous determinant of fertility: The One-Child-Policy in
China and second child permits
The empirical identification of the effect of expected fertility relies on an exogenous variation
in the cost of having another child, which in turn leads to individuals changing their expected
fertility. The One-Child-Policy in China between 1979 and 2015 was based on the goal of one
child per family, setting out fines and penalties for the birth of a second child. At the same time,
regulations for second child permits were issued at the provincial level and changed over time
providing the necessary variation. This section describes the policy and its regulations, as well as
the functioning, motivation and implications of second child permits.
Family planning has been of particular importance to the Chinese government for the past
decades. The experience of the Great Famine during 1959-1961 is said to be a trigger for the
ambitious family planning policies that followed, including the “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign
from 1971-1979, the OCP from 1979-2015 and the recent two-children policy. During the “Later,
Longer, Fewer” campaign later marriage, longer birth intervals and fewer children were promoted 2.
During the OCP, the central government urged provincial governments to enact rules to sub-
stantially decrease fertility rates. While the goal of one child per family was introduced between
1978 and 1980 by the central government, implementation was lagging behind, particularly in
rural areas where the one-child limit met significant resistance (Baochang et al. [2007]). Between
2One child per family was advocated as optimal, two was acceptable but three was considered too much.
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1982 and 1984, provincial governments started to issue more or less formal guidelines under
which married or remarried couples could apply for a second child permit, thereby relaxing the
one child per family limit significantly, mainly in rural areas (Scharping [2013]). Between 1986
and 1991, provincial governments produced official family planning regulations outlying in de-
tail different exemptions. Most of them were revised at least once in the 1990s and again after 2001.
Couples that had a second child without falling into an exemption category were subject to
monetary fines and potentially non-monetary penalties. Scharping [2013] collects information
about the monetary fines and monetary bonus employed to reach the OCP goals. Fines and
bonuses were set as a function of the income of the parents. Parents with higher income thus
had to pay higher fines in absolute terms. Additionally, parents potentially faced non-monetary
penalties such as losing their job or having their career opportunities restricted.
Eligibility criteria for second child permits varied on the provincial level and between rural and
urban areas. The household registration status of the parents (the hukou status), which is either
agriculture/rural or non-agricultural/urban, determined whether and under what conditions a
married couple was able apply for a permit. Most exemptions from the strict one child policy also
required that the applying couple had to respect late child birth (after 24 years old for women)
and an acceptable birth interval (between 4 and 7 years). While officially couples had to obtain
the second child permit before having the second child, this posed a significant financial burden
to local governments, particularly in rural areas, so second child permits were presumably given
out after birth if the couple fell into a specific category (Scharping [2013]). It should also be noted
that, officially, married couples had to obtain a permit for having their first child as well and that
permits were not given to unmarried individuals or couples.
The most used exemption is likely the one that allowed couples in rural areas whose first-born
was a girl to have a second child. In five provinces, couples living in rural areas were always
allowed to have two children (Baochang et al. [2007])3. Couples from ethnic minorities were often
3The provinces are: Hainan, Yunnan, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. In the province of Guangdong, couples
with rural household status were also allowed to have two children until 1998 (Scharping [2013]).
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allowed to have two children or were even completely exempted from the policy. However, this
depended on the province, if the couple lived in a rural or specific minority area and sometimes
even on the size of the minority population. Specifically autonomous regions4 had more lenient
fertility constraints for minority couples.
Most provinces introduced the criterion stipulating that if one or both spouses are an only
child they are eligible for a second child permit at some point, following a statement from the
central government. This policy was motivated by the idea that the one-child-per-family policy
should only hold for one generation.
There were also some specific exemptions for certain occupational groups such as fishermen,
mine workers, veterans, couples that already adopted a child or that had their first child oversees
that are not taken into account here. The category of couples with “real difficulties” is the most
vague and potentially flexible one, making it impossible to evaluate without having governmental
application and acceptance data.
The exemptions I use for my empirical analysis are:
1. In five provinces, couples in rural areas could have two children. In the province of Quangdong,
second child permits were given to couples in rural areas until 1998.
2. Couples living in rural areas whose first child is a girl had an a priori expected number of
children of 1.55.
3. Couples in which one or both spouses belong to a national minority (either in the whole
province or living in rural or specific areas) can have two children.
4. Couples in which one or both spouses are an only child could have two children.
4Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ninxia, Xinjiang and Guanxi
5Specific exemptions I also use: In Jiangsu province, men can have a second child if the first born is a girl and
they do not have a brother. In Jilin province, in rural areas, if one spouse is an only child and the first born is a girl,
the can have a second child.
The expected number of 1.5 is an approximation. However, there are no reports of couples falling into that
exemption that tried to avoid having a son as the first child. The main simplification is that I ignore sex differences
in the costs-benefit analysis of parents.
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Empirical identification of the effect of the reform changes relies on geographical and temporal
variation in the eligibility criteria. Figure 1 illustrates the share of individuals that were allowed
to have only one child, two children or “1.5 children in expectation”. There was high variation at
the beginning of the OCP between 1982 and 1990 and some changes around 1997, when provinces
revised their family planning regulations.
3 Model
3.1 Set-up
To give an intuition of how future family planning can affect schooling investment and in
order to motivate the empirical analysis, I use a two stage model to investigate the incentives
to get educated and have children. In the model, a representative family consisting of two
parents and one focus child must decide how much to invest in the education of the focus child in
period 1. In period 2, the focus child is grown up, married, earns income together with his/her
spouse and the newly formed couple can have children themselves. In the baseline version, I
assume that couples have to pay a fine for having a second child and this fine depends on the
educational level of the now grown-up focus child. I then show how taking away these fines, as it
happens when one becomes eligible for a second child permit, changes the optimal educational level.
It may seem counter-intuitive at first to model both educational decision and fertility decision
as made by the family. One can argue that the educational decision is made by the parents
and the fertility decision by the focus child. However, there are important interactions that
make this simplifying assumption appropriate. For one, the focus child can influence educational
investment by making more or less effort and persuading the parents of their school choice at least
at the teenager stage. Also, parents can influence the focus child’s fertility decision by passing
on their own fertility preferences or fertility expectations and by offering their help raising the
grand-children. This channel is particularly persuasive in China where the family is still the most
important social unit for many individuals.
Parents draw important benefits from having grand-children since they are invested in the
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continuation of their family line besides other biological, social and altruistic motivations. However,
they may see having grand-children as being particularly costly because their focus child has to
invest in raising them and thus may have fewer resources to allocate to the parents when they are
retired and have financial and care needs.
It should also be noted that the educational investment stage and the reproductive stage do
not overlap. This is realistic with regard to primary and secondary education in China which is
usually finished before starting the reproductive stage. In China, the minimum age for marriage
is 20 for women and 22 for men and individuals are strongly discouraged from having children
without being married. If one wanted to analyse tertiary education, an intermediary period for
raising a child or education should be included.
Period 1
In period 1, the family consumes and invests in the education of the focus child. The income of
the family is given exogenously. I ignore the possibility to borrow or save6 and make education the
only available investment mechanisms between period 1 and period 2. Utility in period 1 is given
by
U1 = u(Y − sI) (1)
where u(.) is the utility of consumption, assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, s > 0 the
constant cost of education, Y the exogenous income, and I years of education of the focus child.
Period 2
In period 2, the focus child has grown up and is married. The income he/she earns is
consumed by his/her family7. The newly formed couple has n children for whom they have
to pay some cost. The available income in period 2 depends on the level of education and
on the number of children n the couples has. If the couple has more than one child, they
have to pay a fine for each additional child. This fine depends on the educational level of the
6Including borrowing and saving would mitigate the effects discussed but not remove them. This would only be
the case at corner solutions where families do not invest in education at all.
7The model can be easily extended by adding the income generated by the spouse and a term that captures the
correlation between the spouses’ educational levels.
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focus child I, reflecting the fact that monetary fines are dependent on the household income, a
function of the individual’s educational level, and that couples might have to pay non-monetary
fines such as losing their job or not being promoted. Finally, the family gets some utility from
having (grand-) children, which I assume to be additively separable from the utility of consumption.
Utility in period 2 is given by:
U2 = u(Y (I, n)− pip(I)(n− 1)1(n > 1)− µf(n)) + αh(n) (2)
where Y (I, n) is the income generated by the grown-up focus child available for family consump-
tion, assumed to be strictly increasing and concave in the educational level I8. The p(.) function
indicates the fine that the family has to pay for having more than one (grand-) child, multiplied
by pi which incorporates regional variation in those fines. This penalty depends on the educational
level of the focus child and has the same properties as the income function. Following, µf(n) is
the cost of raising n (grand-) children, assumed to be strictly increasing, with µ being a regional or
individual cost parameter. Finally, αh(n) represents the utility of having (grand-) children, which
is strictly increasing and concave, with α being an exogenous fertility preference parameter.
Overall utility is thus given by:
EU = u(Y − sI) + δ[u(Y (I, n)− pip(I)(n− 1)1(n > 1)− µf(n)) + αh(n)] (3)
with δ being the discount factor.
The model disregards any level of uncertainty and assumes full information. These are clearly
unrealistic assumptions: one is never sure about future income, costs of raising a child, finding a
partner and having a child at the desired time. However, to illustrate the basic mechanisms, this
8An example for this is an income generation function that remunerates individuals for each hour worked multi-
plied by their productivity which is a concave function of education: Y (I, n) = (T −n)P (I) where T is the maximum
time an individual can work and working hours decrease in the number of children, and P (I) is the productivity of
the individual. One could also interpret T as the number of years an individual works in his/her life and the number
of children potentially decreases the years of working.
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model suffices.
3.2 Optimal educational level and optimal number of children
Maximising with respect to education gives the optimal level of education as a function of the
number of (grand-) children n:
u′[Y (I∗)− pip(I∗)(n− 1)1(n > 1)− µf(n)]
[
∂Y (I∗, n)
∂I∗
− pi∂p(I
∗)
∂I∗
(n− 1)1(n > 1)
]
=
s
δ
u′(Y − sI∗)
(4)
We see that the number of (grand-) children can affect educational investment by decreasing
family consumption in the second period, by potentially affecting the returns to education directly
through ∂Y (I
∗,n)
∂I∗ and indirectly through
∂p(I∗)
∂I∗ (n − 1)1(n > 1) when the number of (grand-)
children is higher than 1.
Maximising utility with respect to n gives us the optimal number of children as a function of
education:
u′[Y (I)− pip(I)(n∗ − 1)1(n∗ > 1)− µf(n∗)]
[
µp(I)1(n∗ > 1) + pi
∂f(n∗)
∂n∗
− ∂Y (I, n
∗)
∂n∗
]
= α
∂h(n∗)
∂n∗
(5)
On the left hand side we have the marginal (opportunity) cost of having n∗ (grand-) children
which consists of the marginal cost of raising and educating n∗ children (∂f(n
∗)
∂n∗ ), an additional fine
if the family has more than 1 (grand-) child, and a potential decrease in income due to shorter
working hours. On the right hand side, we have the marginal benefits of having n∗ (grand-) children.
The effect of education on the optimal number of children reflects some standard results: Ed-
ucation increases income and thus makes having (grand-) children relatively less costly. However,
education also increases the opportunity cost of having (grand-) children through ∂Y (I,n
∗)
∂n∗ . Higher
education also implies having to pay a higher fine for the second (grand-) child, increasing the cost
of having another one.
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3.3 Effect of falling into an exemption category
The effect of falling into an exemption category is modelled as a removal of the penalties for
the second (grand-) child. The term pip(I)(n∗ − 1)1(n∗ > 1) is replaced by pip(I)(n∗ − 2)1(n∗ > 2)
since the penalties now only have to be paid from the third (grand-) child onwards.
Since the number of (grand-) children is a discrete variable and since there is no fine for the
first (grand-) child, falling into an exemption category does not necessarily change the optimal
number of (grand-) children given by equation 5. The effect of the exemption thus depends on if
the removal of fines changes the fertility choice or not. There are three cases:
1. Unaffected9: n∗notexempt ≤ 1 and n∗exempt ≤ 1
The optimal number of (grand-) children after the exemption is introduced is the same as
before (one or zero). The family is unaffected by the exemption.
2. Benefiters: n∗notexempt = N and n∗exempt = N where N ≥ 2
The fertility decision is not altered by falling into an exemption category. The family would
not want to have another (grand-) child in this case, however, the family benefits from not
having to pay the fine for the second (grand-) child any more.
3. Increasers: n∗notexempt = N and n∗exempt = N + 1 where N ≥ 1
By falling into an exemption category, the optimal number of (grand-) children increases by
one (grand-) child because the cost of having an additional (grand-) child decreased.
The exemption policy affects educational investment decisions of Increasers and Benefiters as
followed:
Benefiters: n∗notexempt = N and n∗exempt = N where N ≥ 2
Optimal education before was given by:
u′[Y (I∗, N)− pip(I∗)(N − 1)− µf(N)]
[
∂Y (I∗, N)
∂I∗
− pi∂p(I
∗)
∂I∗
(N − 1)
]
=
s
δ
u′(Y − sI∗) (6)
9Using policy evaluation terminology, the unaffected would be never-takers, benefiters would be always-takers
and increasers would be called compliers. However, since in this policy context one child per family is still the
government’s ideal, those who have one child in any case can be thought of as compliers. Therefore, a different
naming was chosen.
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When falling into an exemption, optimal education is given by:
u′[Y (I∗, N)− pip(I∗)(N − 2)− µf(N)]
[
∂Y (I∗, N)
∂I∗
− pi∂p(I
∗)
∂I∗
(N − 2)
]
=
s
δ
u′(Y − sI∗) (7)
Falling into the exemption has two opposing effects: On the one hand, it decreases the
marginal utility of consumption (u′(.)) due to a decrease in the cost of having (grand-) children
by µp(I) (positive income effect). This has the effect of decreasing education because the family
responds with higher consumption and lower educational investment in period 1. On the other
hand, it increases the returns to education by µ∂p(I
∗)
∂I∗ because the fine for the second (grand-)
child is dependent on the income level (positive substitution effect). This leads to an increase in
education. Since there are two potential opposing effects, the total effect can be negative or positive.
Increasers: n∗notexempt = N and n∗exempt = N + 1 where N ≥ 1
Optimal education before was given by:
u′[Y (I∗, N)− pip(I∗)(N − 1)− µf(N)]
[
∂Y (I∗, N)
∂I∗
− pi∂p(I
∗)
∂I∗
(N − 1)
]
=
s
δ
u′(Y − sI∗) (8)
When falling into an exemption, optimal education is given by:
u′[Y (I∗, N + 1) + pip(I∗)(N − 1)− µf(N + 1)]
[
∂Y (I∗, N + 1)
∂I∗
− pi∂p(I
∗)
∂I∗
(N − 1)
]
(9)
=
s
δ
u′(Y − sI∗) (10)
Again, falling into the exemption has two effects: On the one hand, it increases the marginal
utility of consumption (u′(.)) by increasing the cost of having (grand-) children by µ[f(N + 1) −
f(N)]. Also, the grown-up child might be earning less due to having to care for (grand-) children
when Y (I∗, N) > Y (I∗, N + 1) (negative income effect). Thus, the family uses education as a way
to shift consumption from period 1 to period 2 such that equation 4 holds. On the other hand,
the policy change decreases the returns to education if the grown-up child has to cut productive
working hours (∂Y (I
∗,N+1)
∂I∗ <
∂Y (I∗,N)
∂I∗ ) (negative substitution effect). This decreases returns to
education and thus decreases the incentives to invest in education. Again, the overall effect of
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falling into an exemption category can be positive or negative.
3.4 Comparative statics when restricting the choice set to having one or two
children
Theoretical analysis is simplified once the choice set for the number of (grand-) children is
restricted to n = [1, 2]. In the specific Chinese context, this restriction still encompasses the choice
set of the majority of individuals10. The choice of the number of (grand-) children absent of any
second child permits is dependent on the exogenous or individually different parameters µ, pi and
α. This gives us the following comparative statics:
• Fertility preferences α:
Fixing µ and pi at positive levels, families with a low fertility preference α are unaffected, those
with a medium α are increasers and those with a high α are benefiters. This is illustrated
in figure 2: Until α
¯
the family has 1 (grand-) child for fixed µ and pi with or without the
policy exemption. Between α
¯
and α¯, the family would have one (grand-) child absent of the
exemption and two (grand-) children when exempted. Above α¯, the family has two (grand-)
children in any case. α
¯
and α¯ are defined by equation 5.
• Cost of raising a child µ:
The cost parameter of raising the child represents the same idea as the fertility preferences.
Fixing pi and α at positive levels, families facing low costs of raising a (grand-) child µ are
benefiters, those with medium µ are increasers, and those with high µ are unaffected.
• Penalties for having more than one child pi
The effect of the fine is different than the two other parameters. One can see that the fine
does not change α
¯
. Thus, at a certain α and µ, families are unaffected independent of the
fine amount. Intuitively, if families see one (grand-) child as optimal, penalties for the second
(grand-) child are irrelevant. The fine level only changes the threshold between those that
are increasers or benefiters: The higher the penalties, the more families are increasers.
10In the China Family Panel Survey 2010, I find that that of those being born between 1964 and 1974, less than
3% do not have any children, 42.8% have one child, 42.6% have two children, and only 11.7% have three children or
more.
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We know that second child permits should not have any effect on the unaffected, but if we find
a positive or negative overall effect, we do not know if it is driven by families that are benefiters, or
those that are increasers, or both of them. Indeed, in both cases, second child permit reforms can
increase schooling investment. The conditions for a positive effect are summarized in the following
proposition. The results from the comparative statics will help to empirically disentangle the overall
effect of second child permits on schooling investment, differentiating between the effect it has on
individuals that are increasers and benefiters.
Proposition 1 The effect of second child permits on schooling investment is positive
• on families wanting two (grand-) children independent on eligibility for a second child permit
(benefiters) when the reduction in the cost for the second (grand-) child (due to the removal
of fines) is small relative to the increase in the returns to education (due to the fines being
income dependent).
• on families increasing fertility expectations due to eligibility for a second child permit (in-
creasers) when the reduction in the returns to education due to the second (grand-) child is
small relative to the increase in the total cost for raising (grand-) children.
4 Data
4.1 Individual Data
For my empirical analysis I use individual survey data from the 2010 China Family Panel Study
(CFPS). It was designed by a Peking University research team, supported by Peking University
985 funds and carried out by the Institute of Social Science Survey of the Peking University. The
data set in English and Chinese is available online.
For the main cohort, I include individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2000. This leaves
me with 5 405 observations for the main empirical investigation of which 53% are female. Summary
statistics are displayed in table 1. The sample is predominantly rural: 67% hold agricultural
household status and 30% hold non-agricultural household status. However, according to the
census bureau’s definition, in 2010, 52% lived in an urban area due to the growth of urban areas.
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89% of the sample indicate that they are of Han ethnicity. The other main minorities in the
sample are Miao (2.1%), Yi(2.3%) and Man (1.5%)11. On average, individuals stayed in school for
7.6 years. Women stayed in school on average 7.1 years and men 8.18 years. At the same time,
those with a non-agricultural household status spend nearly twice as many years at school as those
with agricultural household status (11.4 compared to 6.1).
One issue is that those in the main cohort, those that turn 16 btween 1990 and 2000 are too
young to have finished their reproductive stage at the time of the survey in 2010. Therefore, I
am not able to use the number of children allowed at age 16 as instrument for the actual number
of children for this cohort. To fill the need for an older cohort that has already finished the
reproductive stage at the time of the survey, I use individuals that turned 16 between 1982 and
1990. The assumption is that, though the educational investment of the older cohort has not
necessarily been affected by the eligibility for second child permits, the number of children they
have should be affected, because their main reproductive age lies within the 1990s. I use this older
cohort to establish the effect of second child permits on the likelihood of having a second child and
to find predictors for fertility outcomes.
The summary statistics for the older cohort are also displayed in table 1. As expected, edu-
cational levels are lower but other characteristics are the same (sex, ethnicity). There are more
individuals with an agricultural household registration status.
4.2 Policy exemptions
Data about province level policies are taken from Scharping [2013] and supplemented by
Baochang et al. [2007] and official family planning regulation documents accessed on-line in
Mandarin Chinese and translated into English12. An excerpt of the data is displayed in table 2.
Based on this information, the number of children one is officially allowed to have is calculated
at the time of the educational decision-making, which is assumed to be 16. The cut-off of 16 is
11 Not all provinces are represented in the sample. In particular, the sample does not cover the autonomous regions
of China (Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xingjiang and Ninxia) with the exception of Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region
which is covered. The main population is sampled from Gansu (12%), Henan (11%), Guangdong (9%), Shanghai
(8.5%) and Lioaning (8.4%).
12This collection of policy information in English was collected by Wanying Zhao and is available upon request.
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chosen because at that time students on average must decide to continue with senior high school
after completing compulsory junior high school. The official exemption policy within the province
should influence this decision.
For the main analysis, I use those turning 16 from 1990 to 2000. This has two reasons:
First, only after 1990 Chinese citizens had official legal documents that they could rely on.
Before, conditions for second child permits were only presented as guidelines and it is de-
batable if implementation and knowledge of exemptions was comparable between provinces.
Second, I do not want to mix up the effects of the policy with the implementation time of the
1986 compulsory secondary school reform. The upper cut-off of 2000 is chosen in order to assure
that in the year of the survey (2010), all educational investment up to the tertiary level is finished13.
The number of children an individuals is allowed to have is a result of the province he or she
lives in, the household registration status (agricultural or non-agricultural), if he or she has siblings,
and if he or she belongs to an ethnic minority. Overall, for those turning 16 after 1990, 32% in
the sample are not subject to any exemption when they were 16 and thus have 1 as the number of
children allowed. 44% fall into the category that they are allowed to have a second child when the
first one is a girl; thus, I define the number of children allowed as 1.5. 23% fall into the category
that they are allowed 2 children.
5 Empirical Approach
5.1 Estimating the effect of second child permits
The first question I examine is if second child permits have an effect on fertility outcome.
If second child permits had no effect on real fertility outcome, they should not change fertility
expectations either. In this case, any effect that the second child permit reforms on education
levels would be driven by benefiters, those who do not change their expected fertility, but benefit
from not having to pay fines for the second child. We would merely learn that income-dependent
13The main results are however robust to including those older (turning 16 between 1982 and 1990) and younger
(turning 16 between 2000 and 2005). Those that are younger are however less affected.
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fines have a negative effect on the educational investment of those that plan on paying them. If
the effect was driven by increasers, those that increase their expected fertility as a response to the
policy change, the policy implications would be more general as it would show how educational
investment can vary with fertility expectations.
Since the main cohort is too young to have finished their reproductive phase in 2010, I use
men and women that turned 16 between 1982 and 1990. In order to investigate the effect of the
policy exemption on the likelihood of having a second child, the analysis is restricted to married14
individuals that already had one child before 2003, such that they have enough time to have
a second child while conforming with promoted birth intervals. Those that have more than 2
children are considered outliers and excluded.
Between 1982 and 1990, some provinces had already introduced exemptions and therefore the
number of children allowed at 16 can be used. However, since this was during an adjustment
period, the policies were not as formalized as those that are used for the later analysis. For
this reason, and to make use of the same variation as for the main cohort, I primarily look at
the number of children allowed when the individual turns 30. This is approximately the age
at which individuals decide to have a second child if they want to stick to the official birth intervals.
For this exercise, an indicator variable of having a second child in 2010 or not is regressed on
the number of children allowed at either age 16 or 30, controlling for individual characteristics that
allow eligibility as well as birth year and province fixed effects:
2nd childi in 2010 = β1nb children allowedip age(16/30) + β2characteristicsi
+β3yearFEt + β4provinceFEp + ipt
(11)
In an additional specification the number of children allowed is adjusted for the sex of the first
child. If the first child is a girl, those that had in expectation 1.5 children are changed to being
allowed to have 2 children and those whose first child is a son are changed to being allowed to
14Unmarried individuals cannot apply for a second child permit.
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have one child. The individual characteristics included are those that determine eligibility for a
second child permit: being of an ethnic minority, having a rural household status and being an
only child. I also include a dummy for living in an urban area in 2010, which might influence
enforcement of the OCP. Education is also used as an explanatory variable. In this way, I
control for the indirect effect through education that the official number of children allowed can
have on the likelihood of having a second child. Furthermore, I control for the sex of the first child15.
Identification comes from the assumption that second child policies are quasi-exogenously im-
plemented for a specific sub-sample within a province and from variation in time and between
provinces. Since the second child permit reforms are done on the province level but only a sub-
group of the province is actually treated, the used approach is the triple difference method (or
Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences). I am able to compare those that were eligible for a sec-
ond child permit at age 16 to those of the same sub-sample that were not eligible at age 16 within
the same province if an exemption was introduced or retracted between 1990 and 2000 and compare
this difference to those within the province that are not affected by a policy change. Provinces that
have already introduced those criteria or introduce them later serve as control for the overall effect
of being in a potential treatment group (e.g. ethnic minority, being an only child) and time specific
effects.
5.2 Estimating the effect of exemptions on education
The overall effect of eligibility for a second child permit on educational investment is measured
in years of education completed in 2010 (years educationip in 2010). The outcome variable is later
replaced by a dummy variable indicating if the individual has finished junior high school or senior
high school. We do not look at university degrees for two reasons: First, they are quite rare in the
predominantly rural sample. Second, while basic education is completed before the reproductive
stage, university education overlaps with the reproductive stage, making analysis theoretically
15Selective abortion is said to be relatively wide-spread and the sex of the first child could be correlated with the
number of children the couple is allowed to have. If they are only allowed one child, they might be more likely to use
selective abortion to make sure the only child they have is a boy. Indeed, in the cohort that I look at, 54% of the
first born children are boys and only 46% are girls.
20
different16.
Similar to in the previous exercise, the explanatory variable of interest is the individual’s el-
igibility status for a second child permit, that is to say the number of children officially allowed
at age 16 (nb children allowedip age(16)). I control for all characteristics that can make someone
eligible for an exemption (characteristicsi). Again, province fixed effects (provinceFEp) and birth
year fixed effects (yearFEt) are included. Due to the triple-differences-approach province-level year
fixed effect can be included to control for province-specific trends (ProvinceFEp ∗ Y earFEt).
years educationip in 2010 = β1nb children allowedip age(16) + β2characteristicsi
+β3yearFEt + β4provinceFEp + ipt
(12)
Again, identification comes from the geographical and time variation of the introduction and
scope of exemptions from the one child policy. Thanks to the triple difference approach, I can also
control for province-specific time trends, thus relaxing the common trend assumption.
The exclusion restriction is that, conditioned on province trends, the sub-groups that become
eligible have the same educational trend as the sub-groups in other provinces that do not change
eligibility status. In order to support this identifying assumption, I run a pre-OCP placebo
test. Identification also implies that provincial family planning policies targeting a specific
sub-population are independent of educational measures that target the same group. For instance,
if provinces that allow second child permits for ethnic minorities during the 1990s couple these
measures with an increase in the educational budget for ethnic minorities areas, the policy measure
captures both. So far, I have not encountered evidence in the literature for such behaviour.
Additional robustness checks aim to strengthen the results, such as verifying that the overall
results are not driven by a specific easily targeted group.
One might be concerned about potential spill-over through migration. However, the Chinese
household registration system restricts the possibility to migrate, particularly between provinces.
16The number of children allowed at age 16 does not have a significant effect on the likelihood to obtain a university
degree.
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Applications for the second child permit can only be submitted at the place of registration and
moving the place of registration is restricted17.
5.3 Separating out the effect on increasers
Until now, only the overall effect of the policy, the intention-to-treat effect, is measured. As
argued in the theoretical section, those that are eligible for a second child policy but do not react
to it because they prefer to only have one child (Unaffected) should only lower the overall effect.
However, one would like to know if the overall effect is driven by those that increase their expected
fertility as a response to eligibility (Increasers) or those that wanted to have two children in any
case (Benefiters) since policy implications are very different. As a first step, I verify that eligibility
has a real effect on fertility outcome.
In the second step, I use proxies for individual and regional fertility preferences (α in the model)
in order to predict the likelihood of having a second child absent of second child exemptions. As
such, I expect the treatment effect to vary according to observable characteristics that I show are
correlated with fertility outcome. Since individual fertility behaviour is difficult to predict, I use
a broad categorization, only differentiating between those with low initial likelihood of having a
second child, those with medium likelihood and those with high likelihood.
For this, the older cohort for which fertility outcome is observed is used to estimate the effect of
fertility proxies and to verify the intuition that those with a medium likelihood of having a second
child react most to second child permits. As proxies, I use the regional fertility rate calculated
as the average number of children that individuals have between the age of 31 and 35 within the
same county, the educational level of the father and the number of siblings. Instead of year fixed
effects a linear trend variable is included.
The estimated significant coefficients of the variables that are already realized at the age of 16
18 are then used to predict the likelihood of someone in the main cohort of having a second child
17Within the main cohort, only 1.2% indicated a different provincial code as place of residence at the age of 12
than at the age of 3 while 5.4% indicated a different county or district code (within-province migration).
18The educational level and the sex of the first child are not realized yet.
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absent of second child exemptions:
Pr(2nd child) pred =
exp(βˆ2charact.i + γˆproxiesipt + βˆ3trendt + βˆ4provFEp)
1 + exp(βˆ2charact.i + γˆproxiesipt + βˆ3trendt + βˆ4provFEp)
(13)
This exercise relies on the strong assumption that the effect of the fertility proxies stays
constant over time. It also depends on the first stage explaining a significant part of the overall
variation in the likelihood of having a second child.
Based on the predicted likelihood of having a second child, the sample is divided into three sub-
samples of equal size: Those with a low likelihood of having a second child absent of second child
policies, those with a medium likelihood and those with a high likelihood. The main regression is
then run on the three sub-samples to see which category drives the main results. The motivation for
using three groups is derived from the three groups behaving differently in the theoretical model.
Sub-sample analysis is chosen as it makes sure that similar individuals (those with similar likelihood
of having a second child) are in the control and treatment groups. It also accounts directly for the
possibility of control variables having different effects in the different subgroups.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Effectiveness of second child permits
First, I estimate the effect of second child permits on the likelihood of having a second child.
The results for the number of children allowed at age 16 and at age 30 are displayed in table 3. I
find that the number of children allowed at age 16 not adjusted for the sex of the first child does
not have a significant effect; however once the variable is adjusted for the sex of the first child it
is significantly positive with an average marginal effect of 5.7 percentage points. The effect comes
from the sub-sample of women. This is probably due to women on average being younger when
they have their first child and therefore the correlation between the eligibility status at age 16 and
at the age when the individual wants to have a second child being stronger.
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The unadjusted number of children allowed at age 30 has a weakly significant positive effect
on the likelihood of having a second child while the adjusted number of children allowed at age 30
has a highly significant effect for both men and women. On average, being allowed a second child
increases the likelihood to have a second child by 10.6 percentage points. The marginal effect is
slightly higher for women, with an increase of 11 percentage points.
I thus find that the official number of children allowed influences real fertility decisions. However,
an increase of approximately 11 percentage points implies that there is a significant share of the
population that does not significantly change their fertility outcomes due to the policy, potentially
because they want only one child anyway, or potentially because they were planning to have two
children and to pay the fine. On the other hand, the existence of criteria for second child permits
that I cannot observe and that are not necessarily foreseeable also introduce some noise and suggest
that the estimate is rather a lower bound.
6.2 Effect of second child permits on schooling investment
The results for the effect of second child permits on schooling investment estimated based on
equation 12 are displayed in table 4. I control for province and year fixed effects and also include
province specific year fixed effects in column 2 as described in the empirical approach section.
Other than the characteristics that allow individuals to be eligible for a second child permit, I
control for the sex of the individual and whether one lives in an urban area according to the 2010
census definition.
The estimation results show that being allowed to have two children instead of one increases
the years of education by around 0.7 years on average. The coefficient does not change significantly
when province specific fixed effects are included. This mitigates the concern that the effect
is driven by provinces that introduce second child permits for a large part of their population
and simultaneously implement some measure to increase the educational attainment of their
population. Furthermore, the effect is higher for men but not significantly so. This empirical
result is evidence that men and women that are allowed to have one more child without having to
pay any fines react by increasing educational investment.
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Next, I check at which stage of the educational career the number of children has an effect on
by looking at indicator variables of finishing junior and senior high school. Results are displayed in
table 5. I find that being allowed to have another child without paying a fine significantly increases
the likelihood to graduate from junior high school by between 5.8 and 8 percentage points on
average and the likelihood of graduating from senior high school by around 6 percentage points on
average.
Following, I run a placebo test to argue that the exclusion restriction is not violated (table
6). I map the eligibility status of those in my main cohort to those that turned 16 before the
introduction of any second child exemptions. I find that the placebo variable does not have any
effect on the educational level of those that turned 16 between 1972 and 198219.
Furthermore, I verify that the overall result is not driven by one specific, easily targeted
sub-group. I find that the effect is mainly driven by the rural population: both by those that are
allowed two children and those with an expected fertility limit of 1.5 (see table 7 column 1 and 3).
The result is also robust to only using the Han sample, indicating that it is not driven by members
of ethnic minorities (table 7 column 2). I also vary the cut off of 16 but the effect for the number
of children allowed stays the same. This is not surprising since the policies do not vary much over
a period of three years and educational decisions are usually not made on one specific date. It
shows that the results are not an effect of picking the right threshold.
Finally, I verify that the results do not change if the amount of monetary fines that one has to
pay for an unauthorized second birth is included. The data for the fines is taken from Ebenstein
[2010] and matched with the year the individual turns 16. I find that the coefficient is unchanged
and the effect of monetary fines on schooling investment is not significant (see table 8). The
coefficient is also unchanged when I include the change of the fines over the last three years. In
any case, once including province-specific time fixed effects, monetary fines cannot be used because
they are fixed on the province level.
19Results do not change significantly if one year earlier or later is chosen for the mapping.
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There are several variables that might have an effect on the impact of the policy. For one, in
provinces that have higher monetary fines, the effect of being eligible for a second child permit
could be higher. However, I do not find evidence for this. I also check if individuals with a
highly educated father have a different intensity of the effect, with the idea that the father’s
education is a proxy for household income. However, I do not find any significant difference.
This might be due to the fact that though individuals with a highly educated father are more
likely to have the means to pay the fines, they are also more likely to have lower fertility pref-
erences. Indeed, as I will show in the next section, this relationship seems to be inversely U-shaped.
As an interesting addition, I find that individuals whose father is a member of the Communist
party are not significantly affected by the second child permit reforms. It is very plausible that those
have already internalized the party rule of one child per family and thus their fertility expectations
are not affected by a change in eligibility rules20.
6.3 Separating out the effect on increasers
The previous results indicate that second child permits have a significant effect on fertility
outcome and on schooling investment. Therefore, I continue to investigate which sub-group drives
the results. First, fertility proxies are included in the regression that predicts having a second child
for the cohort of 1982 to 1990 (see table 9, column 1). The local fertility rate, the educational
level of the father and the number of siblings have a significant effect on the likelihood of having
a second child. Also, having an agricultural household status and living in an urban in 2010 are
important factors. The first child being a girl and the educational level in 2010 are significant as
well but cannot be used to predict fertility for the main cohort because they are not realized at
the age of 16. Overall, all variables explain approximately 35% of the overall variation in having a
second child, which is relatively high for such an individual choice variable.
Based on the significant variables that are already realized at the age of 16, I predict the
20Empirically, it could also be the case that they were always planning with two children due to their family’s
rank and thus do not get affected. However, this explanation does not seem plausible in the context.
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individual likelihood of having a second child absent of second child permit. Figure 3 displays
the distribution of the predicted likelihood. An important share of individuals are bunched at
the lower and upper end of the distribution. Those with a low likelihood are suspected to be
unaffected, and those with a high likelihood benefiters of the reforms.
In my rough approach to distinguish between unaffected, benefiters and increasers, I divide
the sample into three subgroups according to their a priori likelihood of having a second child.
The idea is that individuals with a low likelihood of having a second child (less than 23%) would
not change their view even when becoming eligible. Those with a medium likelihood of having a
second child (between 23% and 72%) are those that are likely to change their fertility expectations,
thus can be considered as increasers. The ones with a high likelihood (over 72%) probably have
two children in any case.
In order to confirm this intuition, I run the same analysis with the older cohort: I predict
the likelihood of having a second child absent of second child permits and based on the re-
sults divide the sample into three groups of equal size. As displayed in table 9 (column 2-4),
the group with the medium likelihood of having a second child reacts most to second child permits21.
The results from the sub-sample analysis are displayed in table 10. The positive overall result
that was found before seems to be driven by individuals with a medium likelihood of having a second
child, supposed increasers: Being allowed to have another child increases education significantly
by on average around 2 years. For those with low likelihood, supposed unaffected, the coefficient
is positive but insignificant. For those with high likelihood, supposed benefiters, the coefficient is
close to zero and insignificant. The latter points to the hypothesis that monetary fines were not
very effective on those that really wanted to have two children. Indeed, I do not find any effect
of monetary fines on fertility outcomes. These results suggest that those for whom the permit
constraint is binding and who increase their fertility expectations increase schooling investment.
21The regression can also be run with an OLS ensuring that the sample size in all three sub samples stays the
same. The results do not change: The group with the medium likelihood of having a second child has the largest
coefficient, is strongly significant and significantly different to the coefficient of the group with high likelihood of
having a second child.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I use a novel empirical approach to address the question of how expected fertility
- the number of children one expects to have in the future - affects educational decisions. For
this, I use the One-Child-Policy in China and the existence of second child permits for a subset
of individuals. The empirical results show that individuals who are allowed to have a second
child without having to pay a fine invest more in education. This perhaps surprising result is
likely a result of the specific Chinese social and economic environment; however, it can still be
a positive sign for policy makers who want to promote fertility and education. Replicating this
result in other countries will be difficult since identification relies on a setting in which fertility
constraints are set exogenously; however, it is important to verify the external validity of the results.
In my model, I sketch one channel of how fertility expectations can positively influence
educational investment: Because children are expensive one might want to ensure to earn sufficient
money in the future in order to be able to provide for children. The overall positive effect depends
on the relationship between lifetime returns to education and fertility. In so far, the policy
implication is nothing novel as it stresses the importance of providing the opportunity for men
and women to stay in or re-enter the labour market without loss of their skills.
However, there are other channels how fertility expectations can affect education that one can
think of. For one, individuals who plan to have more than one child in the future might also plan
to take over important childcare tasks and want to be well prepared for it. It can also increase
the incentive to find a productive spouse to share the cost of raising a child and therefore affect
marriage market returns to education. Also, one parent might want to increase her/his bargaining
power when he/she counts on having to secure sufficient resources for more than one child. Since
bargaining power within the household and education are often said to be positively correlated,
increasing education can be seen as a way to increase bargaining power. In the Chinese context,
one can also add that obtaining a second child permit might come with difficult bureaucratic
hurdles for which the individual prepares by getting more educated. One could also point out a
psychological effect: being allowed to have two children in a society where children are seen as
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essential can imply a more positive attitude towards the future and thus more motivation at school.
China is one specific social and economic environment that has been perturbed by strict policies.
Comparing individuals who plan to have two children instead of one (intensive margin) is not the
same as comparing individuals who do not plan to have any children with those that do (extensive
margin). However, this is one of the first empirical papers that addresses the identification issue of
the relationship between fertility expectations and educational investment and will hopefully lead
to a discussion where case studies of different countries can be compared.
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8 Appendix
22Truncated at 7
23Taking into account the sex of the first child.
24Only if husband does not have a brother.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Main Cohort (turning 16 between 1990 and 2000)
Years of education completed (in 2010) 8.262 4.721 0 22
Female 0.531 0.499 0 1
Han ethnicity 0.89 0.312 0 1
Rural/agricultural household registration status 0.673 0.469 0 1
Year born 1978.702 3.179 1974 1984
Nb children allowed: 2 (at age 16) 0.258 0.438 0 1
Nb children allowed: 1.5 (at age 16) 0.344 0.475 0 1
N 5405
Older cohort: (turning 16 between 1982 and 1990)
Years of education completed (in 2010 6.202 4.674 0 22
Female 0.527 0.499 0 1
Han ethnicity 0.915 0.279 0 1
Rural/agricultural household registration status 0.745 0.436 0 1
Year born 1969.43 2.251 1966 1973
Nb children allowed: 2 (at age 16) 0.144 0.351 0 1
Nb children allowed: 1.5 (at age 16) 0.116 0.321 0 1
Number of children22 1.673 0.821 0 7
Allowed to have 2nd child23 0.35 0.477 0 1
N 6142
Hebei Chongqing Hubei Zhejiang Jiangsu
Family only has girl (rural area) 1989 1997 1987 1995 200224
Ethnic minorities 1982 2002 2002 1990 -
Spouses are only child 1982 1997 2002 1989 1990
Note: Provinces have several other eligibility criteria such as for couples who had their first child
outside of China, remarried couples, couples with a disabled first child etc. that I do not regard.
Based on Scharping [2013] and family planning documents.
Table 2: Example of when provinces formalized eligibility criteria.
32
Figure 1: Evolution of the share of population falling into an exemption category according to the
year they turn 16. Data Source: CFPS 2010.
Figure 2: The effect of ferility preferences on the number of children.
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Figure 3: Frequency table of predicted likelihood of having a second child for 1990/2000 cohort
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Dependent variable:
Indicator: Having a second child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All Women Men
Nb children allowed at 16* 0.0569∗∗∗
(0.0206)
Nb children allowed(16) 0.0268
(0.0242)
Nb children allowed at 30* 0.106∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.0967∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0260) (0.0284)
Nb children allowed at 30 0.0617∗
(0.0360)
Controls for Eligibility Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Indiv. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5241 5241 5241 5241 2858 2376
* Adjusted for the sex of the first child.
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1982 and 1990, that had their first
child before 2003 and have no more than two children. Logit regressions; robust standard errors
in parenthesis. Dependent variable = 1 if the individual had a second child. Coefficients are
average marginal effects. Eligibility controls: Household status, only child status, minority status.
Additional controls: sex, sex of first child, education, living in urban area in 2010. Data source:
China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 3: Predicting the likelihood of having a second child using the number of children allowed at
the age of 16 adjusted and not adjusted for the sex of the first child.
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Dependent variable:
Years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Women Men
Nb children allowed(16) 0.702∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.675∗ 0.883∗∗
(0.222) (0.244) (0.357) (0.356)
female -0.735∗∗∗ -0.718∗∗∗
(0.0963) (0.0984)
Agri. household status -4.193∗∗∗ -4.182∗∗∗ -4.340∗∗∗ -3.983∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.156) (0.229) (0.226)
Han ethnicity 1.343∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗∗ 1.573∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.207) (0.270) (0.337)
Only Child -0.258 -0.197 -0.0196 -0.280
(0.227) (0.248) (0.375) (0.346)
Urban Area 1.867∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗ 2.145∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.127) (0.177) (0.189)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE x Province FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5368 5368 2846 2522
R2 0.454 0.478 0.532 0.467
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2000. Dependent variable is
the years of education the individual completed. Standard OLS regression with robust standard
errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Data source: China Family
Panel Survey 2010.
Table 4: Effect of the number of children allowed at age 16 on the years of education.
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Dependent variable: Indicator for finishing
Junior High School Senior High School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nb children allowed(16) 0.0578∗∗ 0.0801∗∗ 0.0629∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗
(0.0264) (0.0324) (0.0215) (0.0244)
Female -0.0793∗∗∗ -0.0822∗∗∗ -0.0337∗∗∗ -0.0329∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0111) (0.00974) (0.01000)
Agri. household status -0.338∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0222) (0.0112) (0.0127)
Han ethnicity 0.102∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0449∗∗ 0.0450∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0219)
Only Child -0.0252 -0.0311 -0.00599 0.00229
(0.0266) (0.0296) (0.0216) (0.0241)
Urban Area 0.152∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0128) (0.0117) (0.0121)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE x Year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 5405 5165 5405 5182
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2000. Dependent variable is
the likelihood of completing junior high school (columns 1 and 2) and senior high school (columns
3 and 4). Logit regression; average marginal effects displayed with robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Data source: China Family Panel
Survey 2010.
Table 5: The effect of the number of children allowed on the likelihood of completing a degree.
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Dependent variable:
Years of Education
(1) (2)
Yrs of Education Yrs of Education
Placebo: Nb children allowed (16) 0.100 0.172
(0.278) (0.306)
female -1.878∗∗∗ -1.898∗∗∗
(0.0958) (0.0971)
Agri. household status -3.815∗∗∗ -3.824∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.188)
Han ethnicity 0.634∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.234)
Only Child -0.905∗∗∗ -0.933∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.312)
Urban Area 0.924∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.128)
Year FE Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes
Year FE x Province FE No Yes
Observations 6903 6903
R2 0.280 0.307
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1972 and 1982. Dependent variable is the years
of education the individual completed. Standard OLS regression with robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 Data source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 6: Placebo test.
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Dependent variable:
Years of Education
(1) (2) (3)
All Only Han All
Nb children allowed(16) 0.653∗∗ 0.299
(0.282) (0.291)
Agri. household status -4.136∗∗∗ -4.136∗∗∗ -4.472∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.164) (0.195)
Agri. hh status X Nb children allowed(16) 0.797∗∗
(0.326)
Indicator: Nb of children allowed(16)=1.5 0.244
(0.207)
Indicator: Nb of children allowed(16)=2 0.737∗∗∗
(0.254)
female -0.717∗∗∗ -0.661∗∗∗ -0.716∗∗∗
(0.0984) (0.104) (0.0984)
Han ethnicity 1.366∗∗∗ 1.369∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.206)
Only Child -0.244 -0.225 -0.108
(0.263) (0.277) (0.253)
Urban Area 1.844∗∗∗ 1.849∗∗∗ 1.836∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.132) (0.127)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE X Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5405 4813 5405
R2 0.478 0.456 0.478
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2000. Dependent variable is the years
of education the individual completed. Standard OLS regression with robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 Data source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 7: Effect of the number of children allowed at age 16 on the years of education - Robustness
Checks.
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Dependent variable:
Years of Education
(1) (2) (3)
Nb children allowed(16) 0.700∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.244) (0.222)
female -0.737∗∗∗ -0.718∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗
(0.0963) (0.0984) (0.0963)
Agri. household status -4.194∗∗∗ -4.182∗∗∗ -4.195∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.156) (0.149)
Han ethnicity 1.342∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗∗ 1.344∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.207) (0.204)
Only Child -0.250 -0.197 -0.240
(0.227) (0.248) (0.227)
Urban Area 1.869∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗ 1.869∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.127) (0.123)
Fine in years of income -0.0861 -0.182 -0.138
(0.0763) (0.356) (0.0877)
Change in fine (3 yrs) 0.0726
(0.0674)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE x Province FE No Yes No
Observations 5405 5405 5405
R2 0.454 0.478 0.454
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2000. Dependent variable is the years
of education the individual completed. Standard OLS regression with robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 Data source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 8: Effect of the number of children allowed at age 16 on the years of education including
monetary fines documented at the age of 16 as well as the change in monetary fines over the past
three years.
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Dependent variable:
Indicator: Having a second child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Low likelihood Medium Likelihood High likelihood
Nb children allowed at 30* 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0700∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.0628
(0.0272) (0.0414) (0.0518) (0.0616)
Fertility Proxies:
Father’s education (yrs) -0.00336∗
(0.00188)
Number of siblings 0.0141∗∗
(0.00563)
Local Fertility Rate 0.0936∗∗∗
(0.0194)
Trend -0.00263
(0.00326)
Controls for Eligibility Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Indiv. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2618 911 920 830
Note: Sample includes married individuals that turned 16 between 1982 and 1990, had their first
child before 2003 and have no more than two children. Logit regressions; robust standard errors
in parenthesis. Dependent variable = 1 if the individual had a second child. Coefficients are
average marginal effects. Eligibility controls: Household status, only child status, minority status.
Additional controls: sex, sex of first child, education, living in urban area in 2010. Data source:
China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 9: Effect of the second child policy based on the predicted likelihood of having a second child.
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Dependent variable:
Years of education
Low likelihood Medium likelihood High likelihood
(1) (2) (3)
Yrs of Education Yrs of Education Yrs of Education
Nb children allowed(16) 0.728 1.998∗∗ 0.122
(0.545) (0.879) (0.997)
female 0.134 -0.212 -1.536∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.223) (0.228)
Agri. household status -3.278∗∗∗ -4.538∗∗∗ -4.610∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.547) (1.698)
Han ethnicity -0.888∗ 1.376∗∗ 0.728
(0.503) (0.547) (0.505)
Only Child -0.0367 -2.678∗∗∗ 0.504
(0.514) (0.761) (1.704)
Urban Area 1.052∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗ 0.785∗∗
(0.320) (0.373) (0.382)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE X Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1199 1199 1199
R2 0.422 0.503 0.316
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2000. OLS regression with
robust standard errors in parenthesis. Sample divided in three sub samples based on the three
percentiles of the predicted likelihood for having a second child. Data source: China Family Panel
Survey 2010.
Table 10: Effect of the second child policy based on the predicted likelihood of having a second
child.
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